Farm loan waivers to raise state deficits by ₹1.08 tn: India Ratings report

https://www.thehindubusinessline.com/news/farm-loan-waivers-to-raise-state-deficits-by-108-tn-india-ratings-report/article9995895.ece
PTI

MUMBAI, DEC 18

The farm debt waivers announced by the five large States together will widen the combined fiscal deficit of the States by 1,07,700 crore or 0.65 per cent of GDP this financial year, warns a report.

The combined fiscal deficit of the States for FY18 has been budgeted at 2.7 per cent of GDP or 4.48 trillion.

Uttar Pradesh, Punjab, Maharashtra, Rajasthan and Karnataka have announced farm loan waivers this year after a string of farmer suicides in these States.

Nine States have budgeted an increase in their fiscal deficits/gross state domestic product (GSDP) ratios this year compared to 19 states in FY17.

“With several States announcing farm loan waivers, there is a fear that the combined fiscal deficits of the States could be much worse than the budgeted figure,” India Ratings said in a report on Monday.

The report estimates that the combined fiscal deficit of the States in FY18 at 3 per cent of GDP or  4.99 trillion. This is higher than the budgeted figure but considerably lower than FY17.

The report is based on the analysis of 29 State budgets, the impact of the farm debt waivers announced outside the budgets and implementation of GST from July 2017.

While the farm debt waivers announced by UP and Punjab are part of their respective FY18 budgets, the waivers announced by Maharashtra, Rajasthan and Karnataka are outside their budgets.

“These States will have to either generate additional resources to fund farm debt waivers or cut their budgeted expenditure,” the report said.

If such announcements are funded through expenditure compression, the axe usually falls first on the budgeted capital expenditure, followed by social expenditure.

“Both cuts do not augur well from the point of view of the medium to long-term growth prospects of these States,” the report said.

Andhra Pradesh and Telangana, which announced a farm debt waivers of 43,000 crore and 17,000 crore, respectively, in 2014, however have adopted a staggered payment mechanism.

The report, however, said despite fiscal pressures, the encouraging feature of FY18 state budgets is near stability in the combined revenue deficit and some improvements in the combined primary deficit of the states compared to FY17.

The other encouraging feature of the state budgets this year has been the continuation of capex by the states.

Boosted by Uday bond issuances, combined capex of the states grew 40 per cent year-on-year and 26.2 per cent in FY16 and FY17, espectively.

India’s farms report income greater than our GDP! Target them in the war on black money

The opposition is baying for the government’s blood over demonetisation and GST. The first is done and over with. But its effects are not yet over. The second has been modified to assuage large sections of the population.

Source: India’s farms report income greater than our GDP! Target them in the war on black money

The Downside of Repeated Debt Waivers

The Downside of Repeated Debt Waivers

Debt waivers are supposed to help farmers make agricultural investments, repay future debts and tackle any other situation. But the history of waivers in India tells a different tale.

Credit: PTI

Credit: PTI

India is facing an agrarian crisis. There is no doubt that the majority of the small and marginal farmers are indebted. According to the Reserve Bank of India, the amount of outstanding loans given out for agricultural and allied activities by the regional rural banks has increased from Rs 1.80 billion in 1980-81 to Rs 1329.67 billion in 2015-16. According to the 2009 India Human Development Survey, the average outstanding loan for a household was above Rs 50,000. The most popular and yet most debated public policy response to tackle this problem of spiraling farm debts in India has been debt waiver programs.

The theoretical argument in support of debt waiver policies originated in the macroeconomic context of debt relief programs for low income countries. For instance, Bolivia received on average $614 million in foreign aid per year between 1998 and 2002 towards debt relief. These numbers went up further in recent years. Sachs, in his 1989 work, argues that a very high level of outstanding debt reduces the incentive for the debtor to exert effort to repay, a concept captured by the Debt Lafer Curve. Krugman shows that in such a situation a policy of debt forgiveness could induce the optimal level of effort from the debtor and maximise repayment. A similar logic can be borrowed in a microeconomic setting like the agricultural loan waivers. Farmers who run into huge debts, due to uncertainties associated with agriculture, are less likely to be able to come out of the debt trap without any help from outside. Debt waivers are supposed to help the farmer come out of the unforeseen situation, make agricultural investments and be able to repay future debts. The problem arises though, when we consider the specific history of farm loans waivers in India.

A typical agricultural loan contract in India uses land as collateral, which are freed once the loans are repaid. Loan waivers protect households from confiscation of their land by credit institutions in case of default. Effectively, the practice of repeated loan waivers, announced in the wake of state level elections, have contributed towards shaping an expectation among farmers about government intervention to free up their collateral in case of default. This has led to a loss of credibility in the enforcement of loan contracts between the farmers and the banks. The hope for future loan waivers is likely to have generated incentives among farmers to utilise agricultural loans for unproductive purposes and adversely affect agricultural investments.

While the debate regarding efficacy of loan waivers has gained momentum in recent times, agricultural loan waiver programs have been around for a while in India. In 1990, Prime Minister V.P. Singh announced a waiver of up to Rs 10,000 for agricultural loans per household. It cost the government Rs 100 billion to complete the waiver and it took the banks, involved in the scheme, nine years to recover the funds from the government. In the same year, the then chief minister of Haryana, Devi Lal, announced a Rs 2275 million waiver for both cooperative and commercial bank loans. In 2008, the UPA government announced one of the largest debt waiver schemes in the history of India, the Agricultural Debt Waiver and Debt Relief Scheme (ADWDRS). ADWDRS became the most prominent waiver program, at least partly because of its size – a massive Rs 716 billion. It also served as a precursor to the series of state level waiver schemes that followed. In November 2011, the Samajwadi Party government announced a debt waiver of Rs 17.20 billion for Uttar Pradesh, while the Andhra Pradesh (TDP party) and Telengana (TRS party) governments came up with their own waiver packages of Rs 240 billion and Rs 170 billion respectively in 2014-15. In 2016, the AIDMK party announced its waiver package of Rs 57.8 billion for Tamil Nadu as part of its election manifesto. Despite having the second largest fiscal deficit last year, when the BJP won the elections in UP, the state once again had a debt waiver package ready to be implemented. The BJP’s electoral manifesto had committed to write off loans of small and marginal farmers, which would approximately cost the government Rs 370 billion. The states of Maharashtra, Madhya Pradesh, Punjab, Haryana, Tamil Nadu and Gujarat are also in the pipeline to announce their own loan waiver packages, taking the cumulative loan waiver amount in the year 2016-17 to approximately Rs 3200 billion, equivalent to 2.6% of the country’s GDP.

Despite large sums of money being spent on these programs, little is known about their effectiveness. Are they really helping the farmer increase their productivity and pull them out of the debt trap?

Uttar Pradesh debt waiver scheme

To understand how potential beneficiary households respond to repeated waiver programs, we evaluated the UP Rin Maafi Yojana (UPRMY) announced in recent research (Chakraborty and Gupta 2017). Under UPRMY, a household qualified for a waiver based on the amount of loan borrowed and repaid. A timeline of the roll out of the waiver program can be seen in Figure 1.

 

Figure 1: Map depicting phased implementation of the UPRMY

Under the UPRMY, approximately Rs 1700 crore was disbursed as debt relief covering approximately 7.3 lakh farmers from 74 districts. The program was rolled in a phased manner over a period of three years from 2012-2015. About 42 districts received the relief package in 2012-13. In 28 districts, the program roll out happened in 2013-14. The remaining four districts received the waiver in 2014-15. Figure 2 tells an interesting story. Irrespective of which district received the waiver in which year, repayment rates fell dramatically right after the announcement of the waiver program, across all districts of UP. The average rate fell from 25%-50% in 2010-11 (pre-announcement) to 10%-25% in 2011-12 (post-announcement).

Consumption and investment behaviour of eligible vs. non-eligible households

We analyse the change in household behavior following the UPRMY using primary data collected in 2015 from 5,270 individuals in 770 households across six districts of UP. The districts were chosen to include regions from different phases of the program roll-out. Auraiya and Kanpur Dehat received the waiver in 2012-13. Agra and Firozabad received the waiver in 2013-14. We also include Lakhimpur, the only district that did not receive the waiver at the time of data collection and Sitapur, which received the waiver in 2012-13 and is adjacent to Lakhimpur. In each district a household qualifies for loan waiver if it had borrowed an agricultural loan of up to Rs 50,000 from the UP Gramin Vikas Bank. Further, the household was required to have repaid at least 10% of the borrowed amount on or before the programme announcement date.

Table 1: Household Behaviour In Response to UPRMY

Variable Received Loan Waiver Not- Received Loan Waiver
Consumption 41479 32728
Productivity 29397 38690
Income 52623 59051

Note: Consumption, is the yearly consumption expenditure in rupees; Income, is the annual income of a household; Productivity refers to the value of total production over farm size.

The average consumption value of households that received the loan waiver is roughly Rs 41,000, much higher than those of households who did not receive the waiver. This is in spite of the fact that the households that did not receive the loan waiver had a higher income and a higher level of agricultural productivity.

We delve deeper in to this apparent evidence of moral hazard using more rigorous statistical techniques. We compare differences in consumption and investment decisions between potentially eligible and not eligible households in districts that received the waiver vis-à-vis the differences between potentially eligible and not eligible households in districts that did not receive the waiver.

Our findings suggest that eligible households in districts that received the waiver had higher consumption expenditure, approximately by Rs 8,000 per year, as compared to non-eligible households. What is of greater concern is that eligible households also tend to spend significantly more on social events such as weddings, family occasions and so on. In addition, we find that eligible households had no significant productivity gain as a result of receiving the debt waiver compared to non-eligible households. Given that households in the same districts face similar agricultural shocks the insignificant productivity difference between eligible and not-eligible groups suggests a failure of the program to achieve its desired goals.

Rethinking policy interventions

Eligibility of households for loan waiver frees them up from debts and builds expectations of future credit availability. Consequently, the need to arrange for debt repayment falls. In other words, our results indicate, repeated debt waiver program have led to willful defaults. Farmers borrow from banks for agricultural investment but do not undertake the investment. Instead they use up the loan for consumption and are unable to repay the debt in the future. These findings, coupled with Figure 2 suggest that blanket waiver schemes lead households to stop repaying debts irrespective of their waiver eligibility status. This could be detrimental for the financial sustainability of this line of policy. It is important to note, however, that our findings do not speak against loan waiver programs altogether. Rather they warn against implementation of loan waiver programs based on simplistic eligibility rules that do not account for the actual needs of the farmers and the agricultural shocks they have faced. The agricultural sector in India is still vastly affected by scanty rainfall, poor irrigation facility and loans from private moneylenders with high rates of interest. A majority of the defaults could be a genuine disability to pay back due any of these reasons. However, a more thorough understanding is required regarding the effectiveness of different interventions. An alternate policy to explore is agricultural insurance which has seen an extremely low take up rate from farmers so far.

Tanika Chakraborty is assistant professor of Economics at the Indian Institute of Management, Calcutta, on leave from Indian Institute of Technology, Kanpur. Aarti Gupta, an angel investor by profession, has a Phd in Economics from IIT Kanpur, with her doctoral thesis on Loan Waivers in India.

2017: Parliamentary Standing Committee Report on GM Crops

Here is the report of the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Science & Technology, Environment & Forests on GM crops, presented to the RS Chair on 25th of August. This is A UNANIMOUS REPORT, AND 11 OF THE 31-PARLIAMENTARIANS COMMITTEE ARE FROM THE BJP.

http://164.100.47.5/newcommittee/reports/EnglishCommittees/Committee%20on%20S%20and%20T,%20Env.%20and%20Forests/301.pdf

The main gist of what they are saying is carried in these media reports:

http://www.livemint.com/Politics/2RGPg3LZuIz8n4ZwQbGU7L/Govt-told-to-examine-GM-crops-impact-before-rollout-decisio.html

http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/parliamentary-panel-flags-severe-loopholes-in-existing-field-trial-system-of-gm-crops/articleshow/60225365.cms

http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/claims-on-bt-cotton-need-to-be-probed-panel/article19562829.ece

http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/gm-crops-only-after-biosafety-socio-economic-evaluation/1/1034196.html

GM: Parliamentary panel flags severe loopholes in existing field trial system of GM crops | India News – Times of India

NEW DELHI: Just as when the government is readying its response in favour of genetically modified (GM) mustard for submission in the Supreme Court, a parliamentary panel on Friday flagged severe loopholes in existing methods of field trials of transgenic crops and asked environment ministry to examine the impacts of such crops “thoroughly” before taking its final call.

Source: GM: Parliamentary panel flags severe loopholes in existing field trial system of GM crops | India News – Times of India

How will farm loan waivers impact the Indian economy?

https://www.livemint.com/Politics/HcS9M9n9rus7h5JiLQC2ZM/How-will-farm-loan-waivers-impact-the-Indian-economy.html

Farm loan waivers will strain the finances of states, and harm both farmers and banks over the long run

The debt waiver packages, even if limited to a few states, will likely prove to be counter-productive and offer little gains to farmers over the long run. Photo: Mint

The debt waiver packages, even if limited to a few states, will likely prove to be counter-productive and offer little gains to farmers over the long run. Photo: Mint

In its policy statement released last week, the monetary policy committee (MPC) of the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) pointed out that the implementation of farm loan waivers across states could hurt the finances of states and make them throw good money after bad, and stoke inflation.

How much of an impact will the waivers have on the Indian economy?

Mint analysis suggests that the cumulative impact of farm loan waivers is likely to be lower than that of the power-restructuring package, Ujwal Discom Assurance Yojana (UDAY), unless they are extended to all Indian states. However, the debt waiver packages, even if limited to a few states, will likely prove to be counter-productive and offer little gains to farmers over the long run.

So far, three major states—Uttar Pradesh (UP), Punjab and Maharashtra—have announced large-scale farm debt waivers. The debt waiver packages of UP and Punjab were aimed to fulfil poll promises made by the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and the Congress party, respectively, in these two states. The cumulative debt relief announced by the three states amounts to around Rs77,000 crore or 0.5% of India’s 2016-17 GDP.

UP’s debt waiver of Rs36,400 crore is equivalent to one-fourth of the total estimated farm debt in the state. Punjab’s debt waiver worth Rs10000 crore is  equivalent to less than one-seventh of the total estimated farm debt in the state. Maharashtra’s farm debt waiver appears slightly more generous as it appears to cover almost one-third of the state’s farm loans.

If poll-bound states—including Gujarat, Karnataka, Rajasthan and Madhya Pradesh— too announce farm debt waivers and extend it to one-third of farm loans in their respective states, then the aggregate amount of farm debt waivers before the 2019 elections would balloon to Rs2 trillion, or 1.3% of India’s GDP.

The Rs2 trillion hit to state finances is not a small amount but it is lower than the fiscal burden of the UDAY scheme, which originally envisaged states to take over Rs3 trillion of discom (distribution companies) debt. As of now, the UDAY website shows that 15 states have pledged to issue bonds worth Rs2.7 trillion, or 1.8% of India’s GDP.

This means that the current cost of debt waivers, though large, is not yet alarming. But what if all states, and not just the poll-bound ones, decide to waive farm loans, and extend it to half of all farm debt rather than just one-third? In such a case, the total waiver amount will substantially increase to Rs6.3 trillion or around 4% of the GDP.

The extreme case of 50% farm debt waiver should raise concerns as it will worsen states’ debt-to-GDP ratio by 4 percentage points on average. This will jeopardize India’s stated aim to reduce its total public debt, Centre and states combined, to 60% of the GDP.

State-wise outstanding farm debt has been estimated by using available break-up (for previous years) of agricultural loans extended by scheduled commercial banks and regional rural banks. The estimates thus obtained have been scaled up to the total value of institutional farm loans at Rs12.6 trillion. This figure was cited by Union minister of state for agriculture Parshottam Rupala in November last year in response to a question on farm debt.

While the effect of increased public debt will play out over the long run, the increased interest burden due to higher debt will hit state finances immediately. Even if we assume a benign scenario, where debt waiver amounts to only one-fourth of all farm debt, as in the case of Uttar Pradesh, the aggregate interest payment burden of states will rise by 8% (over their 2016-17 levels). Interest payments of states are already quite high, and often eclipse their spending on important infrastructure areas such as roads and irrigation.

The impact on state finances could have been justified had the waivers provided meaningful relief to India’s distressed rural economy. But that is unlikely to happen since the poorest farmers in India typically rely on non-institutional sources of credit, as a previous Plain Facts column pointed out. Instead, as the experience of 2008 shows, farm loan waivers can discourage subsequent lending by banks in districts with greater exposure to the debt waiver, harming farmers over the long run.

Given that farm loans will be transferred from the assets side of banks’ balance sheets to the liabilities side of government’s books as part of the waivers, will distressed banks gain from such moves? Not much, according to a review into the non-performing asset (NPA) portfolio of banks.

Banks might gain in the short run as their loan book gets lighter and they get rid of some non-performing assets. But such waivers and their anticipation in future would damage credit culture. It is not surprising that after the farm debt waiver in 2008, the drop in banks’ agricultural bad loans or NPAs lasted for barely a year before rising sharply once again.

But to put things in perspective, the share of agricultural loans in the total basket of NPAs today is low. In fact, banks with more NPAs tend to have a smaller share of agricultural loans in total NPAs, as the chart below shows. This means that even temporary relief for stressed banks will be quite modest.

Given that the promise of farm waivers have seemed to help both the Congress and the BJP win in Punjab and Uttar Pradesh, respectively, it is likely that India’s political class will increasingly adopt this option in the run-up to the 2019 Lok Sabha elections.

But the above analysis suggests that such waivers are unlikely to help the cause of either distressed farmers or troubled banks over the long run. And they may well impair the quality of public spending by states, as the central bank fears.

a new movement is born 

http://www.tribuneindia.com/mobi/news/comment/a-new-movement-is-born/438580.html

A new movement is born

Yogendra Yadav
Over 150 farmers’ bodies have come together on a common agenda

A new movement is born
TWIN AGENDA: The focus is on fair and remunerative prices and freedom from debt.

Yogendra Yadav

IS the farmers’ movement in India entering a new phase? Six weeks is too short a window to answer this question with certainty. But the nature of farmers’ protest across the country since the beginning of farmers’ strike in Punjab shows signs of something new. This impression is confirmed in a two-week journey connecting farmers, organisations and movements across six states. This journey, Kisan Mukti Yatra, began on July 6 at Mandsaur, exactly a month after the police firing that killed six farmers. The yatra passed through six states before arriving at Delhi. This yatra was a good window into the new world of farmers’ movements, closer to the ground, I am now convinced that we are witnessing the beginnings of a tectonic shift in the history of farmers’ movements.  The media has begun to notice some outward signs of this shift. There have been stories about jean-clad new-age farmer activists. The use of WhatsApp and smartphones has also drawn public attention. But such stories tend to miss the real point. Farmers’ movement is adjusting to the new realities of Indian agriculture and the changing nature of Indian politics.  This is the third generation of farmers’ movements. The first generation comprised a series of peasant rebellions in colonial India. The Mappila peasant rebellion; Gandhian Satyagrah in Champaran, Khera and Bardoli; and Tebhaga struggle in Bengal were largely a reaction of the oppressed peasantry to the British colonial land tenure system. Indepedence brought hope to the peasantry; their movement subsided for a while. The second generation of farmers’ movements took place in the 1980s, led by Mahendra Singh Tikait, economists-turned-activist Sharad Joshi and maverick Majumdar Swami. This was a protest of the relatively better-off farmers, who faced marginalisation in modern, industrial economy. The struggle was waged principally on the issue of remunerative prices. On a parallel track were the struggles of landless labourers, led mostly by Naxalites, against oppression by big landlords. The third generation of farmer activists faces a new context. In the last generation, landholdings have fragmented. The farming sector, as a whole, has faced pauperisation. Farming is clearly an unviable activity. The economic and the ecological crisis of Indian farming is turning into an existential crisis for the Indian farmer. Today’s farmer movement has to face the reality of farmers’ suicides. This new movement is erasing the traditional distinctions of landlord, peasant, sharecropper or landless farmer. Impoverishment of rural India has forced farmers’ movements to bring all sections of farmers together. ‘Kisan mazdoor ekta’ has been a slogan of the Left for a long time, but it is only recently that the slogan has found resonance inside farmers’ movements.This expanded definition of farmer has encouraged the inclusion of various social segments. Dalits and Adivasis are predominantly engaged in farming activities. Yet they were not seen as farmers by mainstream farmers’ movements. This prejudice is beginning to change. As is the greater willingness among peasant movements to engage with Dalits and Adivasi issues. There is also a willingness to recognise women farmers who contribute about two-thirds of the labour. In ideological terms, the new farmers’ movement is moving away from older binaries. The earlier focus on landed versus landless has given way to a realisation that both of them are victims of the economic system. The urban-rural divide epitomised by the binary Bharat versus India has also undergone some rethinking. There is, after all, large chunk of Bharat within India, if not the other way round. There is also a growing realisation that the ecological crisis affects farmers as well as non-farmers and unhealthy farmer cannot but produce unhealthy food for the country. The move away from ideological rigidities has allowed for political unity and policy focus. In an unprecedented move, more than 150 farmer organisations have come together under the umbrella of All India Kisan Sangarsh Coordination Committee. This coalition includes organisations with very diverse political-ideological leanings. It brings together organisations from different parts of the country representing different crops. If this coalition holds, it has tremendous potential for decisive intervention on this issue. Perhaps for the first time, all the farmers’ organisations have agreed upon a common agenda. All organisation within AIKSCC, and even those outside, have agreed to focus their energies on the twin agenda of fair and remunerative prices and freedom from debt. In keeping with the broader definition of a farmer, both these demands have also been defined in a more comprehensive manner. Fair and remunerative price is not limited just to MSP and procurement which benefit less than 1/10th of the Indian farmers. Now the farmers’ movements are demanding actual delivery of the support price announced by the government for all crops and for all farmers. Alternatively, they want deficit payment to cover the gap between the price announced by the government and the price realised by the farmers. Similarly, the demand for freedom from debt is not confined to Kisan Credit Card loans or loans from rural cooperative banks. The demand now also includes freedom from the debt trap of private moneylenders.  This basic shift is reflected in the changing leadership of the new farmers. At the middle rung, the leadership of farmers’ movement comprises leaders with rural roots and urban exposure. They are from farming families, but not always practicing farmers. They understand the pain of the farmers but also speak the language of policy makers. They lead struggles on the ground, but also use RTI and litigation as tools. This youth leadership is the backbone of the new farmers’ movements. Would this new generation of farmers’ movement be more effective than its predecessors? While the need for farmers’ struggle has become more acute than before, the conditions for their mobilisation are more difficult today. It would take an imaginative and uncompromising yet inclusive leadership. Herein lies the challenge for farmers’ movements.  

yogendra.yadav@gmail.com

 

%d bloggers like this: